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KEEPING HELLER OUT OF THE HOME:  HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
Christopher J. Wahl* 
The homeowners association (“HOA”) of Nashboro Village in Nashville, 
Tennessee, adopted a rule in 2007 prohibiting the possession of guns in the 
neighborhood’s homes.1  The rule was passed in response to an increase of 
crime in the area, but residents responded furiously, claiming in the local 
media that the rule was unconstitutional and a threat to their safety.2  The 
HOA retracted by saying that it would change the rule, apparently before 
any legal challenge was undertaken,3 but it is telling that, even before the 
Supreme Court ruled in 2008 in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second 
Amendment protected the individual right to keep a handgun for defense of 
the home,4 homeowners believed that this right was entitled to 
constitutional protection. 
The legality of an HOA ban on handguns5 remains an unsettled 
question.  No litigation on the issue has surfaced in the courts.6  One 
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 1 See Community Suggests Gun Possession Is Illegal For Residents, NEWSCHANNEL5, Mar. 18, 2007, 
http://www.newschannel5.com/story/6242822/community-suggests-gun-possession-is-
illegal-for-residents? (for date of publication, see http://forums.officer.com/forums/
archive/index.php/t-63481.html). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id.  The author’s research did not uncover any indication that legal action was 
undertaken with regard to this controversy. 
 4 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008). 
 5 For evidence of the existence of HOA gun prohibitions, see Community Suggests Gun 
Possession Is Illegal For Residents, supra note 1; New Bills Introduced in 2012, ARIZ. CITIZENS 
DEF. LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP NEWSL., Feb. 2012, at 1 available at http://
www.azcdl.org/AzCDL201202b.pdf (“Still embedded in many governing documents are 
requirements that residents must be unarmed as a condition of living in the 
community.”); SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES:  LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF 
HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS AMERICA 162 (2003) (identifying a firearm prohibition in Bear 
Creek, an HOA in Washington state); Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private 
Communities, 20 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 479, 526 (2009) (“[M]ost HOAs reportedly hold 
restrictions against firearms in homes . . . .” (citing LOW, supra)). 
 6 The author’s research did not uncover any court documents related to the issue.  It would 
be interesting to know to what extent the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) and other 
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academic commentator has argued, before Heller appeared on the horizon, 
that HOA servitudes banning firearm possession in the home are both 
invalid under property law and unconstitutional.7  Yet for the most part this 
topic has been ignored in academic discussion.8  Professor Paul Boudreaux 
briefly conceded that an HOA handgun ban would likely be valid, but he 
argued that legislation should protect the right to bear arms against 
infringement by HOAs.9  Representatives in the Arizona state legislature 
have taken this approach by introducing a controversial bill that would 
prohibit HOAs from banning handgun possession anywhere in an HOA-
governed community except for the HOA management office.10 
This Comment accelerates the discussion of HOA handgun bans by 
assessing the constitutional and property law arguments relevant to a legal 
determination of the validity of an HOA handgun ban.  Part I of the 
Comment provides a brief historical overview of the HOA as a modern 
phenomenon of property law.  This Part also explains the legal standards 
governing HOAs by addressing the constitutional problem of state action as 
 
interest groups have used their political influence to thwart HOA attempts to restrict the 
right to bear arms.  In one instance in which an HOA in California passed a rule banning 
the discharge of firearms within its equestrian community, the NRA and its lawyers 
persuaded the HOA board to rescind the rule.  See NRA Helps California Homeowners 
Convince HOA to Drop Gun Ban Plan, AMMOLAND (Mar. 3, 2011), http://
www.ammoland.com/2011/03/03/nra-helps-california-homeowners-convince-hoa-to-
drop-gun-ban-plan.  Although in that instance opponents to the rule argued that the rule 
was invalid in part because the HOA board failed to observe proper procedure in 
enacting the rule, see id., a legal challenge to the rule most likely would have raised the 
question of the right to bear arms. 
 7 See John-Patrick Fritz, Comment, Check Your Rights and Your Guns at the Door:  Questioning 
the Validity of Restrictive Covenants Against the Right to Bear Arms, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 551, 576 
(2007) (“[C]ourts should invalidate restrictive covenants that completely ban firearms in 
the home as violating constitutional rights and good public policy.”). 
 8 For one off-handed reference, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.:  Citizens United, 
McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 954 
(2011) (citing Fritz, supra note 7) (“A home buyer who covenants not to possess firearms 
is a respectful neighbor; a village of private covenants not to possess firearms is a zoning 
regulation.”). 
 9 See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 526 (arguing that the right to bear firearms is a “relatively 
strong candidate for inclusion in an HOA resident bill of rights”).  See also Fritz, supra 
note 7, at 576 (“[S]tate legislatures should enact laws to statutorily safeguard this right.”). 
 10 H.B. 2095, 15th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012).  See New Bills Introduced in 2012, supra 
note 5, at 1 (“HB 2095 was drafted to allow the residents of HOA governed communities 
the same constitutionally protected right to bear arms they enjoy once they leave the 
boundaries of their neighborhood.”).  But see HOA Admin, Arizona HOA Industry Upset 
About HB2095, SPECTRUM ASS’N MGMT. (Jan. 16, 2012), 
http://www.spectrumam.com/blog/2012/01/16/arizona-hoa-industry-upset-about-
hb2095/ (“If a guest of a resident of a community wants to bring a gun to the playground 
in a planned community HB2095 would block the neighborhood from having any policy 
against it.  It’s pure insanity.”).  This Comment does not address the question of whether 
such legislation is valid. 
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well as the common law test for validity of an HOA servitude.  Part II 
examines the right to keep and bear arms at both the federal and state levels 
to orient the reader to the constitutional policy issues implicated by an HOA 
servitude that bans handgun possession in the home.  The constitutional 
and common law arguments both for and against HOA prohibitions on 
handguns are presented in Part III.  In Part IV, this Comment concludes 
that the post-Heller HOA landscape will be characterized by a patchwork 
approach to the validity of HOA handgun bans. 
I.  HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 
A.  Historical Development of the Homeowners Association 
Before the Industrial Revolution, the detached, single-family residence 
owned in fee simple absolute was the chief residential property arrangement 
in the Anglo-American tradition.11  Eschewing private contractual 
restrictions, homeowners exercised their property rights freely, subject only 
to the law of nuisance and to the occasional land-use regulation imposed by 
a city government.12  Even real estate developers took a hands-off approach 
to selling property by imposing few, if any, restrictions on land use.13 
The character of the privately owned residence transformed when more 
heavily populated and polluted cityscapes developed in the wake of the 
Industrial Revolution.  Zoning laws restructured the contours of cities and 
gave some relief to private homeowners, but the more intricate facets of 
residential neighborhoods remained untouched by government action.14  
The land-use covenant thus proved to be the solution for homeowners who 
sought to exercise control of their surroundings:  this form of contractual 
agreement contained in residential deeds bound homeowners to use, or not 
to use, their property in accordance with terms set forth in the agreement.15  
Because these covenants were binding on future purchasers and enforceable 
by injunctive relief, the agreements gave homeowners assurance that their 
 
 11 See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 483–84. 
 12 See id.  This tradition is embodied by William Blackstone’s observation that “[e]very man’s 
house is looked upon by the law to be his castle . . . .” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 288.  For a list of sources describing the role of the home in the 
development of the Anglo-American legal system, see Thomas G. Sprankling, Note, Does 
Five Equal Three?  Reading the Takings Clause in Light of the Third Amendment’s Protection of 
Houses, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 112, 113 n.12 (2012). 
 13 See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 483 & n.17. 
 14 See id. at 485 (citing the precedent-setting case recognizing zoning as a constitutional use 
of the state-government police power, Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 
(1926)). 
 15 See id. at 484. 
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residential environs would not change without their consent.16  This 
assurance, in turn, increased property values while inducing other 
homeowners to join in the covenants, thereby establishing more stable and 
aesthetically pleasing (or racially homogenous) neighborhoods.17  Real 
estate developers, at least initially, were restrained from capitalizing on this 
legal innovation because of the requirement that the enforcer of a covenant 
contemporaneously be an owner of the property subject to the covenant.18  
Yet before long, developers began to establish HOAs, which were authorized 
to enforce the agreements contained in the residential property deeds sold 
by the developers, even after the original contracting homeowners sold their 
homes to new homeowners.19 
By the late 1920s, subdivisions governed by HOAs were an established 
luxury in the United States, and by the 1960s the market for HOA-governed 
communities expanded to the middle class.20  Today, the HOA model for 
residential community development has evolved into a variety of forms, 
including planned-unit developments, condominiums, and cooperatives.21  
The number of individuals living in association-governed communities in 
the United States has been rising since the 1970s, reaching an estimated 62.3 
million individuals as of 2011.22  Of these communities, about 52% are 
planned unit developments,23 defined as “single-family detached homes built 
according to a master plan, generally in the suburbs.”24  The popularity of 
these communities today is due to their potential to improve residents’ 
quality of life by controlling the community environment and by providing 
residents with easy access to amenities by spreading costs for the amenities 
among all members of the HOA.25  An HOA maintains its ideal environment 
 
 16 See id. at 484–85 (citing the seminal case upholding land-use covenants, Tulk v. Moxhay, 
(1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143). 
 17 See id. 
 18 See id. at 485. 
 19 See id.  HOA-governed communities are also known as “common-interest communities.”  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:  SERVITUDES § 6 (2000) [hereinafter RST 
SERVITUDES]. 
 20 See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA:  HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF 
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 9–10 (1994). 
 21 See id. at 19. 
 22 Industry Data, CMTY ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2012). 
 23 Id. 
 24 MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 19. 
 25 See RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, intro. note, at 68.  The notoriety of these 
communities, on the other hand, is reflected in criticisms that the communities cultivate 
social and racial exclusivity, homogeneity, and paranoia.  See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, 
Privatization and Its Discontents:  Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for 
“the Nice.” 37 URB. LAW. 335, 338 (2005) (“‘[N]iceness’ as a goal does not tend to inspire 
great originality, depth or tolerance.  Nor does it allow much room for heterogeneity of a 
sort that might rock the ‘nice’ boat.  The homogeneity (which some might cast as 
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chiefly by enforcing the HOA’s rules, which can govern a wide range of 
homeowner activity, including architectural and landscape design (from 
house colors to mailbox sizes), use of common property, kinds of pets that 
can be kept in homes, and number of guests that homeowners may 
accommodate at any given time.26 
Three fundamental legal characteristics allow HOAs to achieve their 
defining character:  (1) common ownership of the “common area” property 
(including streets, parks, and recreation centers);  (2) mandatory 
membership in the HOA; and  (3) the bundle of servitudes in the land 
deeds.27  The HOAs are typically organized as non-profit corporations and 
are established by the real estate developer of the community before any 
homes are sold.28  A board of directors, elected by members of the HOA, is 
primarily responsible for managing the community’s affairs and therefore is 
vested with various powers, including the power to collect fees for upkeep of 
the common area and the power to enforce the servitudes of the HOA by 
exacting penalties or taking judicial action.29  The success of HOAs in 
achieving their desired goals is due in part to the rigidity of the rule system.  
Directors are often restrained in their discretion to enforce the rules of the 
HOA, since HOA members can bring suit against directors for inaction.30  
Accordingly, HOA rules are often enforced even when prudence would 
dictate otherwise, and exceptions to the rules are rarely granted.31  
 
blandness) that common interest communities promote can reach beyond the merely 
aesthetic into the realm of the patently exclusionary, as ‘the other,’ however defined, 
finds itself shut out.” (footnote omitted)); Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized Communities and the 
“Secession of the Successful”:  Democracy and Fairness Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1675, 1679 (2001) (identifying “several theories as to how [common-interest 
developments] attenuate the social contract:  (1) they cultivate property owners rather 
than citizens; (2) they harness economic and racial homogeneity; and (3) they 
predominate in new, outer-ring suburban developments, thereby contributing to an 
existing phenomenon of regional polarization”). 
 26 See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1384–
85 (1994) (surveying the various kinds of HOA covenants).  Some HOA rules have 
reached so far as to prohibit placing political signs in yards, parking trucks overnight in 
driveways, piling up magazines in living rooms, wearing flip-flops, and kissing in the 
condominium building’s elevator.  See Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 492–93.  For even 
more examples of HOA restrictions, such as restrictions on “the propriety of wok-
cooking” and the prohibition of “cooking that could produce less than ‘desirable’ 
aromas,” see Franzese, supra note 25, at 336–37, 339–40. 
 27 See MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 19–20.  These servitudes are also known as “covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions,” or “CC&Rs.”  See id. at 20.  This Comment also refers to 
these servitudes as “rules.” 
 28 See id. at 20. 
 29 See id.  See also RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, intro. note, at 70. 
 30 See MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 21. 
 31 See id. 
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Moreover, a change in the rules often requires supermajority consent of all 
HOA members.32 
A homeowner who does not wish to comply with an HOA rule, such as a 
restriction on handgun possession in the home, thus has few attractive 
options:  accede to the rule; violate the rule and suffer the consequences 
(including accrued penalties for repeated violations); sell one’s home and 
move away, thereby relinquishing membership in the HOA; or challenge the 
rule in court, waging a costly legal battle against the highly deferential law of 
servitudes.33 
B.  Legal Standards Governing the Servitudes of Homeowners Associations 
1.  The State Action Problem 
An HOA servitude that would ban handgun possession in the home 
could implicate the constitutional right to bear arms, but the validity of a 
constitutional claim against such a ban is delimited largely by the state 
action doctrine.34  The Restatement recognizes that HOAs “are created by 
private contract and [thus], absent other circumstances, the associations’ 
actions are not state action sufficient to subject them to challenge under the 
United States Constitution . . . .”35  These “other circumstances” that the 
Restatement refers to are two Supreme Court decisions that, despite their 
fame (or notoriety), are viewed by most authorities as outliers. 
The first extraordinary circumstance in which state action could arise 
from private legal affairs was established in the 1946 case Marsh v. Alabama.36  
 
 32 See id. 
 33 For other accounts of the historical development of HOAs, see, for example, MCKENZIE, 
supra note 20; Boudreaux, supra note 5, at 483–94; Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech 
Allowed:  Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free 
Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233, 235–40 (2006); Brian Jason Fleming, Note, 
Regulation of Political Signs in Private Homeowner Associations:  A New Approach, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 571, 576–77 (2006). 
 34 This Comment will assume that the Second Amendment has a state action requirement.  
See also Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36 n.185 
(2012) [hereinafter Blocher, Right Not To] (“I am of course assuming that the Second 
Amendment, like most constitutional guarantees, has a state action requirement.”). 
 35 RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, intro. note, at 70–71.  Accord Reule v. Sherwood 
Valley I Council of Co-Owners, Inc., No. H-05-3197, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25597, at *14 
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005), aff’d, 235 F. App’x 227 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff 
failed to state a claim because none of the defendants is a state actor); Barr v. Camelot 
Forest Conservation Ass’n, 153 F. App’x 860, 862 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that plantiff 
must allege state action in order to make out a constitutional claim under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments); Rehfuss v. Northpoint Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 93-15203, 
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14847, at *2 (9th Cir. June 15, 1993) (holding that no jurisdiction 
exists because defendant is not a state actor). 
 36 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
Jan. 2013] KEEPING HELLER OUT OF THE HOME 1009 
 
In Marsh, the Court applied the constitutional standards of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the arrest and prosecution of a Jehovah’s 
Witness who had, without permission, distributed religious literature in the 
community shopping center of Chickasaw, a town in Alabama owned 
entirely by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation.37  The Court predicated its 
recognition of state action on the finding that the operation of the 
company-owned shopping center was “essentially a public function”:  the 
center was open to the public and was “built and operated primarily to 
benefit the public.”38  Although the Court extended the reasoning of Marsh 
to a privately owned shopping center not located in a company-owned town 
in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,39 the 
Court soon thereafter reined back its reach, overruling Logan Valley and 
limiting Marsh to the particularities of the company-owned town.40  The 
Court made it clear that Marsh would apply only where “the owner of the 
company town was performing the full spectrum of municipal powers and 
stood in the shoes of the State.”41 
The other circumstance in which a court found state action in the 
context of a private agreement arose in Shelley v. Kraemer,42 a case decided 
two years after Marsh.  In Shelley, the Court invalidated a racially restrictive 
covenant as a violation of equal protection upon a finding that a court’s 
enforcement of such a covenant is state action and thus subject to 
constitutional restraint.43  Although the reasoning of Shelley has been 
extended beyond the context of racially discriminatory servitudes,44 most 
 
 37 Id. at 502–03. 
 38 Id. at 506. 
 39 391 U.S. 308, 317–21 (1968) (finding that a privately owned shopping center was the 
“functional equivalent” of the business district in Marsh, and giving First Amendment 
protection to protestors’ picketing). 
 40 See Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569–70 (1972) (rejecting the extension of 
Marsh to a privately owned shopping center).  See also Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 
518 (1976) (“[W]e make clear now, if it was not clear before, that the rationale of Logan 
Valley did not survive the Court’s decision in the Lloyd case.” (footnote omitted)). 
 41 Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569. 
 42 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 43 Id. at 20–21. 
 44 See, e.g., Gerber v. Longboat Harbour N. Condo., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884, 885–86 (M.D. 
Fla. 1989) (invalidating a servitude that severely restricted display of the American flag 
because First Amendment standards applied to the court’s state action of enforcing the 
private agreement), vacated in part on other grounds, 757 F. Supp. 1339, 1339, 1341 (M.D. 
Fla. 1991); W. Hill Baptist Church v. Abbate, 261 N.E.2d 196, 202 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1969) 
(refusing to enforce servitudes that prohibited property owners from constructing places 
of worship because judicial enforcement of such servitudes would be state action in 
violation of the First Amendment). 
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courts and commentators have interpreted Shelley so narrowly as to render 
the case an anomaly.45 
“In the absence of state action, there may be no constitutional 
protection,” but in the rare case that the court finds state action in the 
context of an HOA servitude, the question becomes a matter of 
constitutional law.46  The viability of the state actor argument in the context 
of an HOA ban on handgun possession will be explored further in Part 
III.A. 
2.  The Common Law Presumption of Validity 
Even absent state action, constitutional law may influence an HOA 
servitude’s validity via the public policy exception to the common law 
standard for validity of a servitude.  Under this standard, servitudes are 
subject to a presumption of validity but can be declared invalid under 
particular circumstances.  Various authorities articulate the test in slightly 
differing ways.  The Restatement further provides that a servitude is 
considered “valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public 
policy.”47  State courts recognize variations of this test.48  The Restatement 
 
 45 See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
Shelley “has not been extended beyond the context of race discrimination” and that “the 
concept of state action has since been narrowed by the Supreme Court”); In re Adoption 
of K.L.P., 763 N.E.2d 741, 751 (Ill. 2002) (refusing to find state action “on the mere fact 
that a state court is the forum for the dispute”); Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer 
Incorrectly Decided?  Some New Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 453, 458–70 (2007) (surveying the 
post-Shelley case law and arguing that the vast majority of courts have not extended Shelley 
beyond the context of racial discrimination, that the Supreme Court has even refused to 
apply Shelley in the context of racial discrimination, and that those few decisions made on 
the basis of Shelley can be “better explained by alternative rationales”).  One commentator 
has even deemed Shelley the Finnegans Wake of constitutional law.  See Philip B. Kurland, 
The Supreme Court 1963 Term, Foreward:  “Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative 
and Executive Branches of the Government,” 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 148 (1964). 
 46 RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. d. 
 47 Id. at § 3.1.  An “illegal” servitude is defined as “one that is prohibited by a statute or 
governmental regulation,” such as “[f]air housing acts and other anti-discrimination 
statutes and ordinances.”  Id. at § 3.1 cmt. c.  This Comment will assume the absence of 
any such law prohibiting HOA restrictions on handguns.  There is, however, a bill 
pending in the Arizona legislature that would make illegal almost all HOA restrictions on 
handguns.  See H.B. 2095, 15th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012), supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
 48 Florida law provides that servitudes found in the HOA declaration are “clothed with a 
very strong presumption of validity” and “will not be invalidated absent a showing that 
they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation of public policy, or that they 
abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.”  Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 
393 So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).  Accord Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers 
v. Twin Rivers Homeowners Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1075 (N.J. 2007); Noble v. Murphy, 612 
N.E.2d 266, 270–71 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).  The California test is remarkably similar:  “An 
equitable servitude will be enforced unless it violates public policy; it bears no rational 
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provides that “a servitude that unreasonably burdens a fundamental 
constitutional right” is one kind of servitude that violates public policy.49  
Invalidation of a servitude on these grounds is an invalidation distinct from 
an invalidation made on the grounds that the servitude is unconstitutional.  
In the latter case, the HOA necessarily would be subject to the state action 
doctrine for constitutional standards to apply.50  In the former case, the state 
actor doctrine would not be considered, and the servitude would be subject 
to a public policy analysis, informed in part by the policy concerns evinced 
by the appropriate constitutional provisions.51  The California courts also 
take this approach:  in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Association, 
the California Supreme Court recognized that “a land-use restriction in 
violation of a state constitutional provision presumably would conflict with 
public policy.”52  Although the plaintiff in that case claimed that the 
servitude violated her right to privacy under the state constitution, the 
Court, due to a lack of state action in the facts of the case, construed 
plaintiff’s argument not as a constitutional claim, but rather “as a claim that 
the [HOA] pet restriction violate[d] a fundamental public policy and for 
that reason [could not] be enforced.”53  Other state courts are in accord with 
this distinction.54 
The public policy analysis is based on a balancing of interests, and a 
servitude will be held in violation of public policy if the “risks of societal 
harm . . . outweigh the benefits of validating the servitude.”55  A court will 
look to judicial decisions, legislation, and the federal or state constitution as 
 
relationship to the protection, preservation, operation or purpose of the affected land; or 
it otherwise imposes burdens on the affected land that are so disproportionate to the 
restriction’s beneficial effects that the restriction should not be enforced.”  Nahrstedt v. 
Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1287 (Cal. 1994).  Notably, the Florida courts 
apply a different test if the HOA rule is not contained in the declaration of the HOA, but 
rather is created solely by the board of directors of the HOA.  In such an instance, the 
rule enacted must be “reasonably related to the promotion of the health, happiness and 
peace of mind of the unit owners.”  Hidden Harbour, 393 So. at 640.  The purpose of this 
heightened standard is to “fetter the discretion of the board of directors.” Id.  This 
Comment will assume that HOA servitudes banning handgun possession in the home are 
contained in the declaration of the HOA and thus subject to the lower standard of review. 
 49 RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1(2). 
 50 Id. at § 3.1 cmt. d.  A servitude of an HOA that did not qualify as a state actor would 
therefore not be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
 51 Id. at § 3.1 cmt. h. 
 52 878 P.2d at 1290. 
 53 Id. 
 54 For example, if the language of the Florida case law is compared to that of California and 
of the Restatement, then the Florida courts, in referring to servitudes that “abrogate some 
fundamental constitutional right,” seem to be referring to unconstitutional servitudes as 
distinct from servitudes in violation of a public policy evinced by a fundamental 
constitutional right.  See supra note 48. 
 55 RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. h. 
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sources of public policy.56  The court will balance interests as a matter of 
property law, and not necessarily of the substantive law expressed within the 
sources of public policy.57  For example, in determining whether a servitude 
unreasonably burdens a fundamental constitutional right, “[c]onstitutional-
law decisions may be useful, but are not controlling.”58  Property law policies 
typically considered when balancing interests include freedom of contract, 
protection of expectation interests, and promotion of socially productive 
uses of land.59 
The Restatement identifies various other factors relevant in a public 
policy analysis when a servitude is alleged to pose an unreasonable burden 
on a fundamental constitutional right.  These factors include the 
geographical scope of the servitude;60 the extent to which the purpose of the 
servitude is related to the use or value of the land; the extent to which the 
servitude interferes with the exercise of the fundamental right, including the 
existence of reasonable alternatives for exercising the right; and the 
importance of the beneficiaries’ interest in validating the servitude.61  
Finally, if a servitude impinges an individual’s freedom to exercise his or her 
fundamental rights on his or her individually owned property, then a court 
will give considerably less deference to the servitude unless the targeted 
activity produces negative externalities, or “spill-over effects,” upon the rest 
of the community.62 
Given the variety of interests potentially implicated, and the sensitive 
nature of the act of balancing such interests, the public policy test is 
“necessarily imprecise.”63  While this imprecision may lead one to fear that a 
 
 56 See id. at § 3.1 cmt. f.  See also, e.g., Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1291 (“[W]e discern no 
fundamental public policy that would favor the keeping of pets in a condominium 
project.  There is no federal or state constitutional provision or any California statute that 
confers a general right to [do so] . . . .”); Crane Neck Ass’n  v. New York City/Long Island 
Cnty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d 1336, 1339–43 (N.Y. 1984) (relying upon a body of state 
legislation to evince a public policy that warranted refusing to enforce a servitude that 
prevented the establishment of a residence for mentally handicapped individuals). 
 57 RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. h. 
 58 Id.  The fact that certain rights are protected by a federal or state constitution against 
governmental action “suggests that there is also a public interest in protecting them 
against private action.”  Id. 
 59 Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i. 
 60 Id. at § 3.1 cmt. h.  While a government’s power extends throughout the entirety of its 
jurisdiction, the power of an HOA extends only throughout the properties that are part 
of the HOA. Id.  As such, an individual does not necessarily need to leave a jurisdiction to 
avoid the unwanted influence of an HOA, but an individual must leave a jurisdiction to 
avoid the power of that jurisdiction’s laws. Id.  The broader the geographical scope 
covered by a servitude, however, the more that a servitude’s intrusion upon an 
individual’s autonomy approximates the intrusion imposed by a law. Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at § 3.1 cmt. i. 
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court may have too much leeway, the fact that servitudes are protected with 
a presumption of validity works against the potential bias or prejudice of a 
court applying the flexible public policy test to a servitude.64 
An HOA servitude that bans handgun possession in the home would 
thus be subject to a balancing test based on a state court’s interpretation of 
the state’s public policy.  Given that such a ban touches upon the right to 
bear arms, a fundamental right under the United States Constitution,65 the 
balancing of policies underlying the servitude would need to weigh in favor 
of validity more strongly than would the policies underlying a servitude that 
does not touch upon a fundamental right.  The HOA handgun ban might 
also be subject to constitutional scrutiny if the HOA were deemed to be a 
state actor.  Yet regardless of whether a court addresses a constitutional 
claim or a property law claim against an HOA ban on handgun possession in 
the home, the constitutional standards and policies underlying the right to 
keep and bear arms will be relevant to the court’s analysis. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
A.  Heller, McDonald, and the Second Amendment 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. 
Heller66 and McDonald v. City of Chicago67 have reinvigorated the Second 
Amendment doctrine and inspired a new wave of Second Amendment 
 
 64 Public policy balancing tests are also employed in contexts outside of the law of 
servitudes.  A court may declare a contract term unenforceable as a violation of public 
policy, notwithstanding the public interest in freedom of contract.  See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).  There also is a public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine:  while generally employers are free to fire their employees for 
any or no reason, a discharged employee can recover damages against his employer if the 
employer’s reasons for discharging the employee violate public policy.  See, e.g., Rothrock 
v. Rothrock Motor Sales, Inc., 883 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. 2005) (“[I]f a violation of a clear 
mandate of public policy results in the termination of an at-will employee, that employee 
would have a right of action for wrongful discharge.”); Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 
915, 918 (Va. 1987) (recognizing “an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine 
limited to discharges which violate public policy, that is, the policy underlying existing 
laws designed to protect the property rights, personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare 
of the people in general” (emphasis omitted)).  See also Note, Protecting Employees At Will 
Against Wrongful Discharge:  The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (1983) 
(discussing the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine).  This 
Comment leaves open to question the validity of a contract term (but not a servitude) 
that requires a party to the contract to waive his right to keep a handgun in the home, or 
the validity of a claim that an employer’s discharge of an employee based on the fact that 
the employee kept a handgun at home is a violation of public policy. 
 65 See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text. 
 66 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 67 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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litigation.  On June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court struck down a District of 
Columbia law that had effectively prohibited the possession of handguns in 
residents’ homes.68  In so holding, the Court recognized for the first time in 
over two hundred years that the Second Amendment69 codifies and protects 
the individual “right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of 
self-defense.”70  The Court’s originalist interpretation71 of the language of 
the Amendment rejected the long-disputed notion that the Amendment 
“protects only the right to possess and carry a firearm in connection with 
militia service.”72  Instead, the Court’s interpretation focused on three core 
components of the right to bear arms, as understood by the ratifiers of the 
Second Amendment.  First, the “defense of self, family, and property” is the 
purpose of the right to bear arms.73  Second, the home is where the need for 
this right is “most acute.”74  Third, the handgun, out of all firearms, is 
considered by the American people “to be the quintessential self-defense 
 
 68 Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75.  The law, in relevant part, criminalized the carrying of 
unregistered firearms; prohibited the registration of handguns; and required owners of 
licensed firearms to keep the firearms nonfunctional when at home, “even when 
necessary for self-defense.”  Id. at 574–76. 
 69 “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 70 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050 (summarizing the holding in Heller). 
 71 In interpreting the text, the Court was “guided by the principle that ‘[t]he Constitution 
was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their 
normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.’” Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 
(quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).  There is an ample body of 
literature discussing the Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment in Heller.  For 
an extensive discussion of the role of originalism in Heller, see, for example, Lawrence B. 
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926 (2009) 
(“[T]he Court embraced what has been called ‘original public meaning originalism’—
the view that the original meaning of a constitutional provision is the conventional 
semantic meaning that the words and phrases had at the time the provision was framed 
and ratified.”).  The majority’s originalist interpretation in Heller has also been subject to 
much criticism.  See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule 
of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 254 (2009) (criticizing Heller for “four major shortcomings:  an 
absence of a commitment to textualism; a willingness to embark on a complex endeavor 
that will require fine-tuning over many years of litigation; a failure to respect legislative 
judgments; and a rejection of the principles of federalism”); Saul Cornell, Originalism on 
Trial:  The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 
626 (2008) (criticizing plain-meaning originalism in Heller as “little more than a lawyer’s 
version of a magician’s parlor trick—admittedly clever, but without any intellectual heft”); 
Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32 
(criticizing the majority in Heller for having “exercise[d] a freewheeling discretion 
strongly flavored with ideology,” since “the ‘originalist’ method would have yielded the 
opposite result”). 
 72 Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.  For a chronicle of the so-called “collectivist” interpretation of the 
Second Amendment right, see David T. Hardy, The Rise and Demise of the “Collective Right” 
Interpretation of the Second Amendment, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 315 (2011). 
 73 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
 74 Id. 
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weapon.”75  Because the law being challenged essentially eradicated all core 
aspects of the Second Amendment right, the Court held that the law 
violated the Second Amendment.76 
Because the Court in Heller was faced with a law of the District of 
Columbia, the Court did not reach the question of whether the Second 
Amendment was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Two years later, however, the Court in McDonald held that the 
Second Amendment applies with equal force against the state governments 
as it does against the federal government.77  The Court therefore invalidated 
a Chicago ordinance that “effectively bann[ed] handgun possession” in the 
home.78  In finding that the right to keep and bear arms is “deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition”79 and “fundamental to our scheme of 
ordered liberty,”80 and therefore incorporated against the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,81 the Court declared 
that the right to keep and bear arms is a fundamental right.82 
Heller and McDonald were historical decisions, and their legal 
ramifications are now playing out in the lower courts.83  For HOAs, Heller 
and McDonald mean that, if an HOA imposing a handgun restriction is a 
state actor, disaffected homeowners may bring a constitutional claim for 
violation of the Second Amendment.84  Moreover, by virtue of the fact that 
the Second Amendment right is now a fundamental right, an HOA servitude 
that restricts the right triggers the elevated policy concerns of the test for 
validity of HOA servitudes.85  A court may look not only at Heller and 
McDonald when conducting a public policy analysis, but also to the broader 
contours of the Second Amendment currently manifesting in the lower 
courts. 
 
 75 Id. at 629. 
 76 Id. at 635. 
 77 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
 78 Id. at 3026 (describing ordinances enacted by the City of Chicago and the nearby village 
of Oak Park that are substantively similar to the D.C. law struck down in Heller). 
 79 Id. at 3036 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). 
 80 Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
 81 This is the “process of ‘selective incorporation’” employed by the Supreme Court to 
determine whether “the Due Process Clause fully incorporates particular rights contained 
in the first eight Amendments.”  Id. at 3034. 
 82 Id. at 3042 (“[I]t is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to 
our system of ordered liberty.”). 
 83 See infra Part II.B–C. 
 84 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 85 See supra Part I.B.2. 
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B.  The Post-Heller Second Amendment Doctrine in the Lower Federal Courts 
As groundbreaking as the Heller and McDonald decisions were, the Court 
left many questions unanswered.  Among these are the role of categorical 
exceptions, the means-end scrutiny to apply to challenged laws, and how the 
answers to the former two questions will form a framework for addressing 
Second Amendment claims.  The lower federal courts have responded to 
these questions with some converging results. 
In Heller, the Court identified several categorical exceptions to the 
Second Amendment—categories of laws upon which “nothing in [the] 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt.”86  The first category consisted of laws 
prohibiting certain individuals from possessing firearms:  “felons and the 
mentally ill.”87  The second category concerned laws prohibiting individuals 
from carrying firearms in “sensitive places”:  “schools and government 
buildings.”88  The third category included laws that imposed “conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”89  The Court also identified a 
protected category of laws that prohibit the carrying of “dangerous and 
unusual weapons.”90  The Court further stated that their “list [of categorical 
exceptions] does not purport to be exhaustive”91 and refused “to expound 
upon the historical justifications for the exceptions.”92 
The Heller Court was guided by a means-end analysis.  The Court did not 
identify the precise form of the analysis, but it did set some boundaries.  The 
Court rejected rational basis review because the Second Amendment is a 
“specific, enumerated right.”93  The Court also rejected Justice Breyer’s 
proposal for an “interest-balancing inquiry,” since there is “no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected 
to [such an] approach.”94  What the Court did clarify is that the kind of law 
challenged in both Heller and McDonald—one that infringes upon the core 
of the Second Amendment right—is unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional 
rights.”95  Just as the Court refused to provide an explanation for the 
 
 86 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). 
 87 Id. at 626. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 626–27. 
 90 Id. at 627. 
 91 Id. at 627 n.26. 
 92 Id. at 635.  The Court in McDonald approved of these categories, but again failed to 
provide any guidance thereto.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 
(2010). 
 93 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27. 
 94 Id. at 634. 
 95 Id. at 628–29. 
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categorical exceptions, the Court deferred establishing a particular level of 
scrutiny for Second Amendment claims.96 
The lower federal courts have picked up on these stray threads and 
weaved a Second Amendment doctrine that incorporates both the 
categorical exceptions and the means-ends analysis identified by the 
Supreme Court in Heller.97  In Ezell v. City of Chicago,98 the Seventh Circuit 
articulated a two-step inquiry that already has been employed by the Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.99  The threshold inquiry is 
whether the activity regulated by the challenged law falls into the “scope” of 
the Second Amendment right.100  Consistent with the Court’s originalist 
approach,101 the scope question demands “a textual and historical inquiry 
into [the] original meaning” of the right as understood by the people at the 
time of adoption of the relevant amendment.102  Thus, if a federal law is 
challenged, the court must look to the people’s understanding of the right 
as of 1791, the time of the adoption of the Second Amendment; if a state or 
local law is challenged, the court must look to the people’s understanding of 
the Second Amendment right as of 1868, the time of adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (through which the Second Amendment is 
incorporated against the states).103  According to the Third Circuit, this first 
step of the analysis tracks Heller’s identification of categorical exceptions to 
Second Amendment scrutiny104:  felons and the mentally ill,105 sensitive 
 
 96 Id. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the 
Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”). 
 97 For a more in-depth examination of the developing Second Amendment doctrine in the 
lower federal courts, see Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the 
Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 725–56 (2012). 
 98 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 99 See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 
2012 WL 5259015, at *6–9 (5th Cir. Oct. 25, 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 
518 (6th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.org v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 
2012); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 
627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d. 
Cir. 2010). 
100 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701. 
101 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
102 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701–02 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 
(2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010)). 
103 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03 (citing McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038–47).  For a discussion of the 
Second Amendment’s incorporation against the states, see supra notes 77–82 and 
accompanying text. 
104 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27).  The Third Circuit did not 
include regulations on the sale of firearms amongst these exceptions, despite the fact that 
the Court in Heller indicated that they were “presumptively lawful,” 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 
because if conditions on the sale of arms were protected from judicial examination, then 
“there would be no constitutional defect in prohibiting the commercial sale of firearms,” 
a result “untenable under Heller.”  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n.8. 
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places,106 and dangerous and unusual weapons.107  If the restricted activity 
falls outside the scope of the right (for example, falling within one of the 
categorical exceptions), then the “activity is categorically unprotected, and 
the law is not subject to further Second Amendment review.”108 
If the law passes the threshold inquiry, either because there is 
insufficient historical evidence for a categorical exception or because there 
is no other kind of exception, then the court, pursuant to the Seventh 
Circuit’s framework, applies a means-ends analysis.109  Modeled after First 
Amendment jurisprudence, the level of heightened scrutiny to be employed 
depends upon “how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
 
105 The Third Circuit suggested that these two exceptions could be part of a category of 
“presumptively dangerous individuals,” such as substance abusers, who fall outside of the 
protection of the Second Amendment.  Id. at 92–93.  Undocumented immigrants and 
persons convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence could also be added to a 
potential category of individuals who have committed certain illegal acts.  See United 
States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 24–26 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that individuals convicted of 
misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence “fit[] comfortably among” Heller’s categorical 
exclusions); United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding 
that “the phrase ‘the people’ in the Second Amendment of the Constitution does not 
include aliens illegally in the United States”); United States v. Boffil-Rivera, No. 08-20437-
CR-GRAHAM/TORRES, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84633, at *21–22 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008) 
(finding that undocumented immigrants are not entitled to the protection of the Second 
Amendment due to their lack of membership in the “political community”).  But see 
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding a lack of sufficient 
evidence to support a finding that a misdemeanant convicted of domestic violence fell 
outside the scope of protection of the Second Amendment and therefore setting 
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate standard).  One court has found that lawful 
permanent resident aliens, in contrast, “are among ‘the people’” whose right to bear 
arms the Second Amendment protects.  Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288, 301 
(D. Mass. 2012). 
106 Some courts have declined to identify certain locations as “sensitive” given that the 
Supreme Court did not give guidance as to why a certain place might be “sensitive.”  See 
GeorgiaCarry.org v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1316–17, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011) 
(declining to classify a “place of worship” as a “sensitive place” but still finding that a law 
prohibiting the possession of firearms in places of worship passes intermediate scrutiny), 
aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012). 
107 Included among these are short-barreled shotguns, Heller, 554 U.S. at 625 (citing United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)), and machine guns, United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 
868, 874 (8th Cir. 2008). 
108 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03.  The threshold “scope” inquiry is modeled after the Court’s free-
speech jurisprudence under the First Amendment.  See id. at 702; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 
89 n.4 (noting that “Heller itself repeatedly invokes the First Amendment in establishing 
principles governing the Second Amendment”).  For an in-depth comparison of the 
doctrines of the First and Second Amendments, see Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and 
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 401–04, 413–14, 
416 (2009).  For a longer discussion of Heller’s categorical exclusions, see Brannon P. 
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Heller, High Water(mark)?  Lower Courts and the New Right 
to Keep and Bear Arms, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1247–60 (2009). 
109 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703. 
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Amendment right and the severity of the law’s burden on the right.”110  
Thus, “broadly prohibitory” laws, such as those in Heller and McDonald that 
banned handgun possession in the home, are “categorically 
unconstitutional,” whereas less restrictive laws can be subject to varying 
degrees of scrutiny.111 
Other courts have taken somewhat different approaches to Second 
Amendment claims.  The First Circuit analyzes laws both by comparing the 
laws to the categorical exclusions and by subjecting the laws to means-ends 
scrutiny.112  The Ninth Circuit in Nordyke at first required that laws pass a 
“substantial burden” threshold test before receiving heightened scrutiny, but 
refused to identify which form of heightened scrutiny would apply.113  Upon 
rehearing en banc, however, the majority did not articulate a Second 
Amendment test because a change in the case’s underlying facts did not 
require it.114  Another alternative approach proposed by one scholar is to 
confine Second Amendment protection exclusively to possession in the 
home, “subject to nearly plenary restriction” elsewhere.115 
A variety of other questions have been posited by commentators in the 
wake of Heller yet remain untested by litigation.  One commentator has 
questioned the validity of laws that prohibit firearms in public housing.116  
Another has argued that bans on firearms in the residence halls of public 
colleges and universities should withstand constitutional scrutiny.117  
 
110 Id. at 703. 
111 Id.  For example, if the law imposes a “severe burden on the core Second Amendment 
right of armed self-defense,” then the government must demonstrate “an extremely 
strong public-interest justification and a close fit between the government’s means and its 
end.” Id. at 708.  However, if the law regulates “activity lying closer to the margins” of the 
scope of the right, then “modest burdens on the right may be more easily justified.” Id. 
112 United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011). 
113 Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2011). 
114 Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Should the County add new 
requirements or enforce the ordinance unequally, or should additional facts come to 
light, Plaintiffs or others similarly situated may, of course, bring a new Second 
Amendment challenge to the relevant laws or practices.  But in the present case, they 
cannot succeed, no matter what form of scrutiny applies to Second Amendment 
claims.”).  In his concurring opinion joined by three other judges, Judge O’Scannlain 
stated that he “would expressly adopt the measured, calibrated approach developed in 
the original three-judge panel majority opinion.” Id. at 1045–46. 
115 See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut:  Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1280 (2009) (proposing that the Second Amendment be treated as 
protecting “a robust right to possess [a firearm] in the home, subject to nearly plenary 
restriction by elected government officials everywhere else.” (footnotes omitted)). 
116 See Jamie L. Wershbale, The Second Amendment Under a Government Landlord:  Is There a 
Right to Keep and Bear Legal Firearms in Public Housing?, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 995, 996–97 
(2010). 
117 See Joan H. Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
235, 238 (2011). 
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Professor Blocher has raised the question of whether “the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee of an individual right to keep or bear arms in self-
defense should include the freedom not to keep or bear them at all.”118  The 
extent to which corporations possess rights under the Second Amendment, 
a question posed by Professor Miller,119 may also weigh into a court’s 
consideration of an HOA ban on handguns, especially since HOAs are often 
organized as non-profit corporations.  The answers to all of these questions, 
together with the contours of the Second Amendment doctrine as currently 
being developed by the lower federal courts, could bear on the policy 
analysis of a court confronted with a challenge to an HOA servitude banning 
handgun possession in the home. 
C.  State Constitutional Law and the Right to Bear Arms 
Another piece to the puzzle of the right to bear arms is the status of this 
right under state constitutions and in state courts.  Of the fifty states, six do 
not have any kind of provision in their state constitutions protecting the 
right to bear arms.120  This means that forty-four states have a provision in 
their constitutions that in some way protects the right to bear arms.121  About 
thirty of these state provisions explicitly identify the right in terms of the 
purpose of self-defense,122 while three explicitly define the right in terms of 
“common defense.”123  Five of the state constitutions, like the U.S. 
 
118 See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 4. 
119 See Miller, supra note 8, at 954–55. 
120 These states are California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York.  See 
Stephen R. McAllister, Individual Rights Under a System of Dual Sovereignty:  The Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 881 & n.67 (2011).  Notably, a proposed right to 
bear arms amendment to the Iowa constitution has already been approved by the Iowa 
House of Representatives but is currently stalled in the Iowa Senate.  See Rod Boshart, 
Gun-law changes likely stalled in the Iowa state Senate, SIOUXCITYJOURNAL.COM (Mar. 5, 2012, 
5:09 PM), http://siouxcityjournal.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/gun-law-changes-
likely-stalled-in-the-iowa-state-senate/article_812868bf-8961-5762-9d93-
ab2621802f50.html.  The proposed amendment provides that: 
The right of an individual to acquire, keep, possess, transport, carry, transfer, and 
use arms to defend life and liberty and for all other legitimate purposes is 
fundamental and shall not be infringed upon or denied.  Mandatory licensing, 
registration, or special taxation as a condition of the exercise of this right is 
prohibited, and any other restriction shall be subject to strict scrutiny. 
  H.R.J. Res. 2009, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2012), available at 
http://coolice.legis.state.ia.us/linc/84/external/HJR2009_Reprinted.pdf. 
121 See McAllister, supra note 120. 
122 See id. at 881 & n.68.  The proposed right to bear arms amendment to the Iowa 
constitution does contain self-defense language.  See H.R.J. Res. 2009, supra note 120. 
123 These states are Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Tennessee.  See McAllister, supra note 120, 
at 881 & n.69. 
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Constitution, have language in the provision relating to a militia,124 and six 
do not specify any purpose for the right.125 
Naturally, state courts play a central role in interpreting these provisions.  
A major question before state courts now that the Second Amendment has 
been incorporated against the states is how, if at all, state courts will 
continue to interpret their own state constitutional right to bear arms 
provisions. 
It is a fundamental principle that state supreme courts are the final 
arbiters of state constitutional law.126  While the predominant trend of state 
courts today is to interpret state constitutional law “in lockstep” with federal 
constitutional law,127 state courts still have the authority to exercise 
interpretive independence.128  What this means for the right to bear arms is 
that a state might interpret its constitution to allow more government 
restrictions on the right to bear arms than the Second Amendment allows.  
In the context of constitutional law, of course, the state’s higher tolerance 
for firearm regulation will have little practical import because federal law, by 
providing a higher “floor” of constitutional protection, will preempt state 
law.129 
 
124 These states are Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.  See id. at 
881 & n.64 
125 These states are Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island.  See id. at 
881 & n.70. 
126 See Joseph Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323, 
334 (2011) [hereinafter Blocher, Reverse Incorporation] (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Each State has power to impose higher 
standards governing police practices under state law than is required by the Federal 
Constitution.”); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New 
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100 (2000) (“State supreme courts have 
the unquestioned, final authority to interpret their state constitutions.”). 
127 See id. at 339 (citing Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State 
Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 47 (1992); Robert K. Fitzpatrick, 
Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an Independent Source of Individual 
Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1850 (2004); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, 
Federalism, Liberty and State Constitutional Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1997)).  
For a brief historical overview of the changing dynamics between the federal and state 
constitutions, see Blocher, Reverse Incorporation, supra note 126, at 329–33. 
128 See Blocher, Reverse Incorporation, supra note 126, at 334 (citing James A. Gardner, State 
Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power:  Toward a Functional Theory of State 
Constitutions, 91 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1030 (2003)).  In principle, a state court can interpret a 
state constitutional provision differently than a federal constitutional provision “even if 
the two are identically worded and even though the state itself cannot violate the federal 
standard.”  Id. at 332 (citing Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 
65 TEMP. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1992)). 
129 See McAllister, supra note 120, at 876 (“[A] state constitutional interpretation giving lesser 
rights than the U.S. Constitution cannot have legal effect so long as the federal 
constitutional ‘floor’ remains in effect.” (citing Dorothy Toth Beasley, Essay, Federalism 
and the Protection of Individual Rights:  The American State Constitutional Perspective, 11 GA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 681, 695–96 (1995))). 
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But a significant practical difference might exist when a state court 
conducts a public policy analysis under the law of servitudes.  The state 
constitution has been declared the highest source of a state’s public policy,130 
and so a state court conducting a public policy analysis of an HOA ban on 
handguns may give more weight to the policy evinced by the state right to 
bear arms provision than to the policy evinced by the federal Second 
Amendment.  Furthermore, if the policy evinced by a state right to bear 
arms provision conflicts with the policy evinced by the Second Amendment, 
the state policy might trump the federal policy in the analysis, given the 
weight accorded to state constitutions in public policy analysis. 
Thus, even where federal law might preempt state law in the context of a 
constitutional claim, state law has the potential to be more influential than 
federal law in the context of a public policy analysis under the law of 
servitudes.  For example, in 1984, the Illinois Supreme Court in Kalodimos 
upheld a ban on handguns as constitutional under the Illinois Constitution’s 
right to bear arms provision because the law prohibited only one “discrete 
categor[y]” of firearms.131  While this handgun prohibition obviously would 
be struck down as unconstitutional under Heller and McDonald,132 the Illinois 
courts today have not explicitly overruled Kalodimos when confronted with 
right to bear arms claims.  Illinois appellate courts have recognized that 
under Kalodimos, the Illinois right to bear arms provision may provide less 
protection than the Second Amendment, suggesting that Kalodimos could be 
invalidated.133  Yet the courts have relied only upon the federal Second 
 
130 See, e.g., Hennessey v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., 609 A.2d 11, 17 (N.J. 1992) (“[T]his 
Court is not likely to perceive the state’s highest source of public policy, namely, its 
constitution, as irrelevant.”); Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 
917, 924 (Pa. 1989) (Zappala, J., concurring) (“No more clear statement of public policy 
exists than that of a constitutional amendment.”) 
131 Kalodimos v. Vill. of Morton Grove, 470 N.E.2d 266, 272–73 (1984). 
132 See David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1120–21 (2010) (giving various reasons why 
this law would be unconstitutional under Heller and McDonald).  Before Heller, many state 
courts analyzed claims of infringements of the right to bear arms under a “reasonable 
regulation” standard, which, while not as lenient as rational basis review, asked simply 
“whether a law effectively destroys or nullifies the ability of law-abiding people to possess 
firearms for self-defense.”  See Tina Mehr & Adam Winkler, The Standardless Second 
Amendment, AM. CONST. SOC., Oct. 2010, at 6, available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Mehr%20and%20Winkler%20Standardless%20Second%20
Amendment.pdf (explaining the “reasonable regulation” standard).  But see Kopel & 
Cramer, supra at 1119 (pointing out that some state courts had used other kinds of tests). 
133 See People v. Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d 816, 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“We agree with defendant 
that in light of the holdings in Heller and McDonald, Kalodimos’ interpretation of [the 
Illinois right to bear arms provision] appears to provide less protection than does the 
second amendment.”).  Accord People v. Robinson, 964 N.E.2d 551, 556–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) (finding “no reason to depart from Aguilar in this case”).  But see People v. Mimes, 
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Amendment in adjudicating claims and have refused to rule upon Kalodimos 
on the grounds that only the Supreme Court of Illinois would have the 
power to do so.134  One Illinois appellate court faced with the issue stated 
that McDonald made it unnecessary even to address the Illinois right to bear 
arms again.135 
Yet the Illinois right to bear arms is not necessarily irrelevant and may 
continue to exert an influence in Illinois courts as long as Kalodimos is not 
overruled.  As the doctrine in Illinois now stands, the Illinois right to bear 
arms, as interpreted in Kalodimos, exhibits a higher degree of tolerance for 
firearm regulation than does the federal Second Amendment.136  And 
although the Second Amendment preempts the Illinois provision in the 
context of a constitutional claim, the Illinois provision might nevertheless 
exert a stronger influence in the context of a public policy analysis under 
the law of servitudes. 
The policy underlying state constitutional law therefore can play an 
independent and significant role in a court’s determination of the validity of 
 
953 N.E.2d 55, 73 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“We note, however, that the analysis and holding 
in Kalodimos have been impliedly overruled by Heller and McDonald.”). 
134 See Aguilar, 944 N.E.2d at 828 (“[O]nly our supreme court may change its 
holding . . . Accordingly, we must decline defendant’s invitation to ‘revisit’ Kalodimos.” 
(citations omitted)).  Accord People v. Williams, 962 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) 
(“Any reexamination of Kalodimos would be the task of the Illinois Supreme Court.”); 
People v. Montyce H., 959 N.E.2d 221, 229 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (“[E]ven if [Kalodimos] 
should be revisited in light of Heller and McDonald, ‘only our [Illinois] supreme court may 
change its [own] holding.’” (internal citation omitted)).  The Supreme Court of Illinois 
has not ruled upon this question. 
135 Williams, 962 N.E.2d at 1151 (“[I]n light of the application of the second amendment to 
the states by McDonald, there is no need to resort to constructions of the Illinois 
Constitution’s provision applicable to the right to bear arms.”). 
136 The Colorado courts, in contrast, have exhibited a lower degree of tolerance for firearm 
restrictions, both before and after Heller.  See Eugene Volokh, Colorado Courts Continue to 
Protect Felons’ Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:55 
PM), http://volokh.com/2012/03/01/colorado-courts-continue-to-protect-felons-rights-
to-keep-and-bear-arms [hereinafter Volokh, Felons’ Rights to Keep and Bear Arms] (citing 
State v. Carbajal, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 303 (Colo. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2012)); Eugene 
Volokh, Felons’ Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Colorado, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sep. 16, 
2011, 6:41 PM), http://volokh.com/2011/09/16/felons-right-to-keep-and-bear-arms-in-
colorado (citing People v. DeWitt, 2011 Colo. App. LEXIS 1523 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011)).  
Each of these cases reaffirmed a prior Colorado Supreme Court decision that permitted 
felons charged with a felony firearm possession to raise the affirmative defense that the 
felon possessed the firearm for the purpose of defense of home, person, and property.  
See People v. Ford, 568 P.2d 26, 28 (Colo. 1977).  Although Professor Volokh notes that 
“felons in Colorado get only limited benefit from this ruling, because they are still 
generally barred by federal law from possessing a gun, and the Colorado Constitution 
doesn’t affect the application of that federal law,” this divergence from federal law 
nevertheless evinces a distinct state constitutional policy that could weigh into a public 
policy analysis.  Volokh, Felons’ Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Colorado, supra. 
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an HOA ban on handguns, in which case the federal policy emanating from 
Heller may not have the last say in a court’s adjudication. 
III.  VALIDITY OF HOA SERVITUDES THAT PROHIBIT HANDGUN 
POSSESSION IN THE HOME 
A.  HOA Handgun Bans and the State Action Doctrine 
An HOA ban on handgun possession could implicate the right to bear 
arms, but because HOAs are organizations formed by private agreement, a 
court would very likely not subject an HOA servitude to constitutional 
scrutiny.137  Under rare circumstances, however, a plaintiff might be able to 
bring a constitutional claim against an HOA. 
If the HOA governs a community that is a company town or that at least 
approximates a municipality by “performing the full spectrum of municipal 
powers and st[anding] in the shoes of the State,”138 the HOA might be 
deemed a state actor under Marsh and thus subject to the federal or state 
constitution.139  The California Court of Appeal, however, has indicated that 
Marsh is a high hurdle to clear: 
[A] homeowners association is not a quasi-municipality.  It does not 
perform most of the functions of a municipality (such as providing police 
and fire services, schools, libraries and utility services), and those limited 
functions it performs that resemble municipal functions (levying 
assessments, maintaining common areas, enforcing rules) are also 
performed by entities (such as corporations or private recreational clubs) 
that are not governmental entities.  Moreover, a municipality enjoys 
privileges and immunities not available to a homeowners association.140 
One commentator put a spin on Marsh by positing that the state action 
doctrine could apply where consumer choice in housing is severely limited 
to HOA-governed developments.141  The potential for this state of affairs is 
found in the increasing prevalence of HOA-governed developments and of 
zoning regulations that effectively mandate that new homes be built in 
HOA-governed developments.142  If all of the HOAs in a given area ban some 
kind of constitutional right, leaving an individual with no reasonable 
 
137 RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, § 6, at intro. note (“[A]bsent other circumstances, the 
associations’ actions are not state action sufficient to subject them to challenge under the 
United States Constitution . . . .”). 
138 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972).  See also supra Part I.B.1. 
139 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
140 Sher v. San Diegueno Hills Homeowners Ass’n, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2960, at 
*16 (Apr. 11, 2006). 
141 See Chadderdon, supra note 33, at 239–40. 
142 Id. 
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residential option that would allow the exercise of such right, then a 
constitutional challenge could arise under the state action doctrine.143 
Another vehicle for application of the state action doctrine to an HOA 
ban on handgun possession is through Shelley, although this doctrinal 
passage is extremely narrow.144  At least one court has rejected the argument 
that Shelley could subject an HOA to constitutional standards,145 and 
although Shelley has been applied in the context of HOAs’ infringement of 
First Amendment rights,146 most judges and academics have concluded that 
the state-action rule in Shelley should not be used to adjudicate disputes.147  
Thus, it is unlikely that a court would expand the reasoning of Shelley to find 
that a court’s enforcement of a servitude banning possession of handguns in 
the home violates the Second Amendment. 
In the rare event that state action is found, an HOA ban on handgun 
possession in the home would be unconstitutional.  Just like the laws 
invalidated in Heller and McDonald, the ban would eradicate the core of the 
Second Amendment right:  self-defense in the home with a handgun.  But in 
the likely absence of state action, an HOA handgun ban would be better 
challenged as a violation of public policy under the law of servitudes. 
B.  HOA Handgun Bans Under the Law of Servitudes 
It is quite possible that an HOA ban on handgun possession in the home 
would be valid under property law.148  First, the servitude is subject to a 
presumption of validity, as all servitudes are.  Second, it is possible that a 
court would find that the servitude does not violate public policy because 
the servitude does not unreasonably burden the fundamental constitutional 
right to keep and bear arms:  a balancing of the interests and public policies 
implicated by the servitude, including federal and state constitutional law 
policy and property law policy, would indicate that the benefits of enforcing 
the servitude far outweigh the risks of societal harm posed by the servitude.  
Yet given the flexibility of the public policy analysis, it is also possible that a 
court would find that the servitude is an unreasonable burden on the 
fundamental right to bear arms, and thus invalid.  If this issue were litigated 
in state courts, the likely result would be a patchwork of decisions (some 
upholding the servitudes, some invalidating them) that vary by state and 
possibly by region. 
 
143 Id. 
144 See supra Part I.B.1. 
145 See Hutton v. Shamrock Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, No. 3:09-CV-1413-O, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 115953, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 14, 2009). 
146 See supra note 44. 
147 See supra note 45. 
148 For an explanation of the reasonableness test for servitudes, see supra Part I.B.2. 
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1.  Federal Constitutional Law Policy 
While constitutional law is useful to a public policy analysis, especially an 
analysis that concerns a fundamental constitutional right, it does not control 
the analysis.  The most obvious federal constitutional policy against an HOA 
ban on handgun possession in the home is Heller.149  Heller’s definition of the 
core of the Second Amendment right as self-defense of the home with a 
handgun150 certainly evinces a public policy disfavoring a ban on handgun 
possession in the home.  The core of the Second Amendment right, as 
defined by Heller, and the fundamental nature of the right, as determined by 
McDonald, might be sufficient for a court to declare an HOA ban on 
handguns invalid, especially if the state right to bear arms has been 
interpreted in “lockstep” with the Second Amendment or if the court is 
inherently biased toward gun rights. 
Yet a more nuanced approach to the Second Amendment might dull the 
perceived severity of an HOA’s infringement upon this right.  As an initial 
consideration, the Second Amendment is applicable to federal government 
action through Heller and to state and local government action through 
McDonald, but not to private action; to this extent the Second Amendment 
evinces a policy to protect individuals from government impositions on their 
right to bear arms but to remain neutral with regard to voluntary restrictive 
agreements between private individuals. 
Additionally, the federal courts of appeals employ a means-end analysis 
when adjudicating Second Amendment claims.151  This inquiry is concerned 
in part with how restrictive a regulation is on the right to bear arms.  Heller 
and McDonald, by invalidating handgun bans that covered an entire city, 
suggest that “broadly prohibitory” laws are “categorically 
unconstitutional.”152  The Seventh Circuit in Ezell, guided by this reasoning, 
entered a preliminary injunction against a law banning all firing ranges 
within a city.153  Yet while a law that bans handgun possession in all homes in 
a city is unconstitutionally broad, an HOA servitude prohibiting handgun 
possession in a specific tract of homes within a city is nowhere near as broad:  
the law extends throughout the entirety of a jurisdiction, but the servitude is 
 
149 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (finding that a law that 
banned handgun possession in the home was unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights”). 
150 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (summarizing the holding in Heller). 
151 See supra Part II.B (describing how the lower federal courts use a means-end analysis 
derived from the majority opinion in Heller). 
152 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (2011). 
153 Id. at 710 (“Perhaps the City can muster sufficient evidence to justify banning firing 
ranges everywhere in the city, though that seems quite unlikely.  As the record comes to 
us at this stage of the proceedings, the firing-range ban is wholly out of proportion to the 
public interests the City claims it serves.”). 
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enforceable only against action occurring on properties that are subject to 
the HOA.  If a homeowner does not wish to live in a neighborhood that bans 
handguns, then the homeowner can pack up and move to a more agreeable 
neighborhood without necessarily having to leave the jurisdiction.154  
Moreover, property law policy favors servitudes that cover no more than a 
reasonable amount of land area.155  So while Second Amendment policy may 
disfavor broad restrictions on the right to bear arms, such as a law banning 
handgun possession throughout an entire city, a court might view an HOA 
servitude banning handgun possession in just one residential development 
as hardly an unreasonable burden. 
Although the Seventh Circuit in Ezell ruled that it is a “profoundly 
mistaken assumption” that “the harm to a constitutional right is measured by 
the extent to which it can be exercised in another jurisdiction,” this 
principle may not apply in a public policy challenge to an HOA handgun 
restriction.156  A court might simply decide that this is a principle of 
constitutional law, which does not control in a public policy analysis.  A 
court might even recognize that property law policies cut the other way by 
lending deference to servitudes that prospective homeowners can 
reasonably avoid.  An HOA ban on handgun possession in the home still 
leaves reasonable alternatives to individuals who wish to own firearms.  In 
addition to moving out of the HOA-governed community, under a strict 
reading of a servitude banning handgun possession, an individual can keep 
a firearm other than a handgun at home.  An individual who still wishes to 
own a handgun can store it in an off-site storage unit, at a firing range, or at 
another residence.  If a family is concerned for its self-defense, the family 
can rely on the HOA’s security personnel (gated communities, for example, 
often have guards at the entrance), their home-security system, other 
weapons of self-defense,157 or the police.  A court could conclude that if 
none of these reasonable alternatives is agreeable to a homeowner 
challenging the handgun ban, then the homeowner should not have 
purchased a home in the HOA.  A court thus could decide not to disrupt the 
 
154 A homeowner can therefore “vote with his feet” amongst various HOAs (or 
neighborhoods not governed by HOAs) in the same way that homeowners vote with their 
feet amongst municipalities.  See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 
J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (“The consumer-voter may be viewed as picking that 
community which best satisfies his preference pattern for public goods.”). 
155 See RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19 and accompanying text (describing how the 
“geographical scope of a private party’s power to impose servitudes on an unwilling 
purchaser” should be considered). 
156 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 697 (analogizing to First Amendment jurisprudence). 
157 For a discussion of non-lethal self-defense in the context of the right to keep and bear 
arms, see Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the 
Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199 (2009) (arguing that 
non-lethal weapons bans may interfere with certain constitutionally protected rights). 
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expectation interests of the other HOA members or undermine the other 
valuable public policy considerations of the HOA ban by vindicating the 
home purchaser who willfully puts himself in a dissenting position. 
Another relevant dimension to the Second Amendment, suggested 
recently by the Eleventh Circuit, is that the Second Amendment must be 
interpreted in harmony with private property rights.  In GeorgiaCarry.Org v. 
Georgia, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a state law that 
prohibited the carrying of firearms in places of worship without the 
permission of the owner of the place of worship.158  In so holding, the Court 
rejected the proposition “that the Second Amendment in any way abrogated 
the well established property law, tort law, and criminal law that embodies a 
private property owner’s exclusive right to be king of his own castle.”159  
Thus, if an individual owner of private property has the right to exclude 
firearms from the property because the right to bear arms “must be limited 
by the equally fundamental right of a private property owner to exercise 
exclusive dominion and control over its land,”160 then it arguably should 
follow that a group of owners of private property organized as an HOA also 
should have the right to exclude firearms, including handguns, from the 
HOA properties. 
Answers to certain unresolved questions may suggest that Second 
Amendment policy favors an HOA ban on handgun possession in the home.  
For instance, if the Second Amendment contains a right not to keep or bear 
arms,161 then this policy strongly favors the collective action of homeowners 
to agree by contract to keep firearms, handguns included, out of their 
neighborhoods.  Also, if prohibitions on handgun possession in public 
housing162 or college dormitories163 withstand constitutional scrutiny, then 
such a ruling would evince a Second Amendment policy to consider the 
particular nature of the community or residence affected by the ban.  A 
private community of individuals voluntarily agreeing to restrict their right 
to possess a handgun at home could be favored by such a policy. 
 
158 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012). 
159 Id. at 1264. 
160 Id. at 1265.  A right to exclude guns from one’s private property is tied to the broader 
question of whether there exists a right not to keep or bear arms.  See Blocher, Right Not 
To, supra note 34, at 4 (proposing that “the Second Amendment’s guarantee of an 
individual right to keep or bear arms in self-defense should include the freedom not to 
keep or bear them at all”). 
161 See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34. 
162 See Wershbale, supra note 116 (exploring the Second Amendment in the context of 
public housing). 
163 See Miller, supra note 117 (claiming that McDonald grants universities the constitutional 
permission to prohibit firearms on campus). 
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Finally, if corporations have Second Amendment rights,164 then the many 
HOAs that are organized as not-for-profit corporations could possess Second 
Amendment rights.  The recognition of the right to bear arms in HOAs 
themselves could be irrelevant if the HOA ban on handguns targets only 
individual homeowners, and not the HOA as a distinct entity.  But 
recognition of the right in HOAs could also complicate the analysis if an 
HOA handgun ban targets the HOA itself.  For example, such a ban might 
prevent the HOA from employing armed security guards.  Disarming the 
HOA in this manner could undermine the justification for disarming 
individual residents, since residents reasonably could want security guard 
protection in exchange for the residents’ agreement to be bound by the 
HOA handgun ban.  On the other hand, city police would remain available 
to ensure residents’ safety, and so an HOA ban targeting both residents and 
the HOA itself might be a reasonable burden and thus valid. 
2.  State Constitutional Law Policy 
Like federal constitutional law, state constitutional law does not control a 
public policy analysis, but unlike the federal constitution, the state 
constitution is the most important source of public policy that can be 
considered in the analysis.165  Some states might interpret their state right to 
bear arms provisions in lockstep with federal law.  For these states, the policy 
evinced by the Second Amendment, as discussed above, may be equally 
evinced by their own state provisions.  However, some states might assert 
their power to interpret their state constitutions independently of federal 
law, even though the Second Amendment may preempt state constitutional 
claims.  If these states reach different understandings of their right to bear 
arms provisions, then the state can develop more policy reasons to favor 
HOA bans on handgun possession in the home. 
Six states do not have any sort of state constitutional provision protecting 
the right to bear arms,166 which suggests a policy of relative neutrality of the 
state vis à vis HOA handgun bans.  Moreover, there are five states whose 
provisions contain clauses relating to a militia purpose for the right.167  
Although the Court in Heller did not read the Second Amendment’s Militia 
Clause as limiting the purpose of the right to bear arms, a state court, relying 
 
164 See Miller, supra note 8 (analyzing Second Amendment rights in the context of the 
corporate form after McDonald and Citizens United v. FEC). 
165 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
166 These states are California, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, and New York.  See 
McAllister, supra note 120, at 881 & n.67; see also supra note 120 (describing the recently 
proposed right to bear arms amendment to the Iowa constitution). 
167 These states are Alaska, Hawaii, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.  See 
McAllister, supra note 120, at 881 n.64. 
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on legal considerations particular to its own state constitution, might read its 
own clause as imposing such a limitation or might disagree with the 
interpretation of the Second Amendment’s Militia Clause in Heller.168  This 
reading could suggest that the policy of the right to bear arms is to promote 
militia service, which would not be harmed by an HOA’s ban on handguns.  
Three other states explicitly define the right to bear arms as for the purpose 
of “common defense.”169  This collectivist approach suggests a policy more in 
line with a militia-purpose approach, and to that extent public policy is not 
threatened by an HOA ban, since militias need not necessarily store their 
arms in homes. 
Nevertheless, a large remainder of the states have right to bear arms 
provisions much more similar to the Second Amendment.  As previously 
mentioned, if these states interpret their state provisions in lockstep with the 
Second Amendment, then this parallel could weigh in favor of invalidating 
an HOA ban on handguns. 
The legal standards that states apply to alleged infringements of state 
right to bear arms provisions also weigh into the analysis.  Most states 
traditionally employed the “reasonable regulation” standard, which is 
concerned only with absolute infringement of the right to bear arms.170  This 
standard reveals a policy of tolerance towards all but the most excessive of 
prohibitions.  Since an HOA ban on handguns would ban only handguns, 
and only on properties subject to the HOA, the ban would likely be 
consonant with these states’ constitutional policies.  And while Heller might 
lead some state courts to adopt a more restrictive legal standard for a state 
right to bear arms, the current position of the Illinois appellate courts 
suggests that state courts may pursue adjudication of Second Amendment 
claims alone, and thus either leave state right to bear arms doctrines frozen 
in pre-Heller condition171 or develop the doctrines independently.  The 
Colorado courts, on the other hand, have interpreted their state right to 
bear arms as even more protective than the Second Amendment,172 which 
 
168 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Structural Interpretation of the Second Amendment:  Why Heller 
is (Probably) Wrong on Originalist Grounds, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 171, 174–78 (2008) 
(suggesting that the Court in Heller misapplied the Militia Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution when interpreting the Second Amendment). 
169 These states are Arkansas, Massachusetts, and Tennessee.  See McAllister, supra note 120, 
at 881 & n.69. 
170 See Mehr & Winkler, supra note 132. 
171 See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text (explaining how Illinois state courts have 
refused to change the state right to bear arms doctrine in spite of Heller and McDonald). 
172 See supra note 136 (describing how the Colorado state courts have recognized a felon’s 
affirmative defense under the state right to bear arms provision that likely would not be 
recognized under the Second Amendment). 
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evinces a policy that would exhibit less tolerance for an HOA ban on 
handguns. 
State courts may interpret their state constitutions in still other distinct 
ways.  For example, Heller and McDonald asserted that the handgun was the 
“quintessential” self-defense weapon, but what if a rural state considered the 
rifle or the shotgun to be the “quintessential” self-defense weapon?173  In 
such a case, a state court might not consider an HOA ban on handgun 
possession to be a violation of public policy, even though an HOA ban on 
rifle possession would be. 
3.  Property Law Policy 
A variety of property law policies weigh in favor of enforcing an HOA 
ban on handgun possession.174  The primary justification for imposing such a 
servitude most likely is safety175:  the keeping of guns in the home has been 
linked to unintentional gun injuries,176 suicide,177 and homicide.178  One 
study found that “for every time a household gun was used for self-defense, 
there were 4 unintentional shootings, 7 criminal assaults or homicides, and 
11 attempted or completed suicides.”179  Not surprisingly, a large majority of 
 
173 While “a mere 20 percent of gun-owning individuals have only handguns[,] 44 percent 
have both handguns and long guns, reflecting the fact that most people who have 
acquired guns for self-protection are also hunters and target shooters.”  Philip J. Cook et 
al., Gun Control After Heller:  Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA 
L. REV. 1041, 1047 (2009). 
174 See supra Part I.B.2. 
175 See Cook et al., supra note 173, at 1049 (“The threat of being shot prompts private citizens 
and public institutions to undertake a variety of costly measures to reduce this risk, and 
many people live with anxiety arising from the lingering chance that they or a loved one 
could be shot.”). 
176 Matthew Miller et al., Firearm storage practices and rates of unintentional firearms deaths in the 
United States, 37 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 661, 661–67 (2005) (finding an 
increased risk of unintentional firearm death in states where gun owners were more likely 
to store loaded guns and an even higher risk in states where the loaded guns were more 
likely to be unlocked). 
177 Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Suicide in the Home in Relation to Gun Ownership, 327 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 467, 470 (1992) (finding that the risk of suicide is five times greater in homes with 
guns and two times greater in homes with handguns than in homes with long guns only). 
178 Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Gun Ownership as a Risk Factor for Homicide in the Home, 329 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1084, 1087 (1993) (finding that individuals who keep firearms at home 
are about three times more likely to be murdered and about eight times more likely to be 
murdered by a family member or intimate acquaintance). 
179 Studies and Reports, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.bradycampaign.org/studies/view/102 (last visited Mar. 11, 2012) 
(summarizing Arthur L. Kellermann et al., Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home, 
45 J. OF TRAUMA:  INJURY, INFECTION & CRITICAL CARE 263, 263–67 (1998)). 
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Americans today do not possess a gun.180  The empirical literature on the 
effect of guns on safety is, however, inconclusive,181 and while “the statistics 
should be largely irrelevant as a constitutional matter,”182 the validity of an 
HOA servitude is a matter of state property law, not only constitutional law.  
Residents’ mere belief that handgun bans lead to safer communities,183 even 
if empirically untrue or inconclusive, implicates fundamental policies of 
property law that would favor validating the ban. 
First, if the ban on handguns has been in place long enough, the HOA 
residents will have developed an expectation interest in the servitude, and a 
court could respect the peace of mind that the servitude has brought to the 
community.  Moreover, if prospective purchasers of HOA homes also believe 
that handgun bans increase safety, then these purchasers may be willing to 
pay a safety premium on the price of the home, which in turn supports the 
policies of promoting the productive use of land and of supporting 
servitudes that relate to the value of the land.  To the extent that prospective 
purchasers pay less for homes that are not protected by handgun bans,184 
declaring an HOA handgun ban invalid as against public policy actually 
undermines the public policy that favors the enhancing of home values. 
A court might be suspicious of the ban because it restricts the exercise of 
a fundamental right on an HOA resident’s individually owned property, but 
this suspicion could be allayed by the fact that guns, even if stored on 
individually owned property, produce negative externalities on the 
neighborhood.185  These spill-over effects include potential violence, even if 
accidental, to neighbors visiting the home where the gun is stored as well as 
 
180 See Cook et al., supra note 173, at 1045 (“[A]bout 75 percent of all adults do not own any 
guns.” (citing PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA:  RESULTS OF A NATIONAL 
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 12 (1996))). 
181 Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 3 n.11 (comparing Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, 
Armed Resistance to Crime:  The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 150, 151–52 (1995) (concluding that victims who use a gun or other 
weapon to resist crime are less likely to be harmed than those who do not resist or resist 
unarmed), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less 
Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202 (2003) (arguing that shall-issue gun laws 
more likely increase rather than decrease crime)). 
182 Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 3–4 (pointing out that Heller allows an individual 
to make his or her own decision whether or not to own a gun). 
183 In one national survey, respondents were asked whether, if more people in their 
neighborhood began carrying guns, they would “feel more safe, the same, or less safe.”  
See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 98 (2004).  Sixty-two percent of 
respondents said they would feel “less safe,” whereas only 12% said they would feel “more 
safe.”  See id. 
184 See Cook et al., supra note 173, at 1049 (“[T]he threat of gun violence in some 
neighborhoods is an important disamenity that depresses property values and economic 
development.”). 
185 See supra notes 176–79 (describing how guns in the home have been linked to 
unintentional gun injuries, suicide, and homicide). 
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potential violence to neighbors when the gun is removed from its home and 
brought to other parts of the neighborhood.  Although the data underlying 
this belief is disputed,186 a court may find the data in support of the handgun 
ban sufficient at least to weigh this policy concern amongst the others. 
Finally, a court might give weight to the policy of freedom of contract—
that is, the fact that a homeowner voluntarily agreed to be bound by the 
HOA’s rules when the homeowner bought his or her home.187  While this 
factor is case-specific and does little to answer the broader question of 
whether an HOA ban on handguns is valid in principle, a court might 
consider various dimensions of this policy, including whether the servitude 
existed when the homeowner purchased the home or whether the servitude 
was enacted after the home was purchased; whether the homeowner was 
prevented from learning about the servitude or whether the homeowner 
knew or should have known about the servitude; and, if the servitude was 
enacted after the homeowner purchased the home, whether the procedure 
used to enact the servitude was valid.188 
4.  Other Sources of Public Policy 
Another source of public policy upon which an opponent to an HOA 
ban on handguns might rely is the fact that his or her state attorney general 
(“SAG”) was among the thirty-eight SAGs that, on behalf of their respective 
states, signed an amicus brief in McDonald arguing for incorporation of the 
Second Amendment.189  A court could arguably interpret this action as the 
state’s adoption of federal Second Amendment policy.190  However, a court 
might view the signing of an amicus brief as a poor indicator of public policy 
when compared to the traditional sources of public policy, since the state 
 
186 See supra note 181 and accompanying text (showing the disagreement over whether gun 
safety laws are effective). 
187 See RST SERVITUDES, supra note 19, at § 3.1 cmt. i. 
188 See id. 
189 See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521).  Thirty-one states did so in Heller.  
See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290). 
190 The plurality in McDonald considered the states’ amicus brief in its reasoning.  See 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3049 (citing the brief as evidence of a “popular consensus” that 
the right to bear arms is fundamental).  But see Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism 
and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 108, 112 (2008) [hereinafter Blocher, 
Popular Constitutionalism] (“[I]ncorporation is extremely difficult to justify on the 
federalism grounds [the SAGs] invoked.”).  Obviously McDonald was not a case that 
involved a public policy analysis, but courts do consider state amicus briefs in deciding 
cases.  See Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of Federalism 
Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355 (2012) (discussing the role of state amicus briefs in cases 
involving issues of federalism). 
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and federal constitutions, state legislation, and state court judicial decisions 
all bear the imprimatur of the democratic will of the people or, in the case 
of judicial decisions, the neutrality of a judge.  While the actions of most 
SAGs are, like legislation and constitutions, politically influenced,191 the 
people of a state are not nearly as involved in government attorneys’ 
decisionmaking.  Moreover, government attorneys are not impartial 
decisionmakers like judges, but rather are partial advocates entrusted with 
protection of state government in legal disputes.192  Even assuming that SAG 
action is an appropriate source of public policy, an SAG’s signing of the 
amicus brief in McDonald may nevertheless have only marginal effect on the 
analysis, since “all the states that signed the McDonald amicus brief (and all 
but a handful of the states that did not) already guarantee an ‘individual’ 
right to keep and bear arms in their own constitutions, often in terms more 
expansive than those of the Second Amendment.”193 
One rare but emerging source of public policy that strongly disfavors, if 
not invalidates, HOA bans on handgun possession are local laws that require 
all residents to possess handguns at home.194  The constitutionality of these 
laws is open to question,195 but it seems likely that an HOA servitude 
prohibiting handgun possession in the home would violate these laws and 
thus be invalid as illegal and not merely in violation of public policy. 
A final consideration is that a court may be biased toward gun rights and 
invalidate the HOA handgun ban, notwithstanding the servitude’s 
presumption of validity and the federal constitutional, state constitutional, 
 
191 Forty-three states elect their SAGs by popular vote.  See About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS 
GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2012).  Additionally, 
“many [SAGs] go on to seek other elected offices, so they have strong incentives to be 
seen as representing the will of the people.”  Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 
190, at 110. 
192 See, e.g., Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 190, at 111 (pointing out that SAGs 
are advocates for their states). 
193 Id. at 111 (citing Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. 
REV. L. & POL. 191 (2006)). 
194 These laws have been passed in Kennesaw, Georgia; Greenleaf, Idaho; Geuda Springs, 
Kansas; and Virgin, Utah.  See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34 at 37–38 (citing Anna 
Fifield, Kennesaw, where everyone is armed by law, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2010), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5c1b6a72-c5eb-11df-b53e-
00144feab49a.html#axzz16d4dQ5T3; Glenn Reynolds, A Rifle in Every Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2007, at A21; Kansas community requires households to have guns, USA TODAY (Nov. 23, 
2003), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-11-23-kansas-guns_x.htm; Town in 
Utah Requires Owning Guns, ABC NEWS (Nov. 5, 1994), http://abcnews.go.com/
US/story?id=95092&page=1). 
195 See Blocher, Right Not To, supra note 34, at 37–40 (addressing the constitutionality of 
mandatory possession laws in the context of a posited “right not to keep or bear arms”). 
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and property law policies favoring the servitude.196  Given that public policy 
analysis is, by its nature, a flexible exercise of judicial decision making, 
judges might exercise their discretion in a manner that withstands appeal.  
Furthermore, given the political susceptibility of a judiciary comprised of 
elected judges,197 a state court that once validated an HOA handgun ban 
may, in a different political climate, invalidate the ban, especially if the 
state’s supreme court has not yet ruled on the issue. 
IV.  A PATCHWORK APPROACH TO THE VALIDITY OF HOA HANDGUN 
BANS 
A court will validate an HOA servitude that prohibits handgun 
possession in the home as long as a public policy analysis indicates that the 
servitude does not unreasonably burden the right to keep and bear arms.  
The policy behind the Second Amendment articulated by Heller can be 
construed to strongly disfavor such a servitude, and a court may have the 
discretion to invalidate the servitude based on this policy alone.  A court may 
be so inclined especially if the state’s courts interpret the state right to bear 
arms provision in lockstep with the Second Amendment.  Other states, 
however, have traditionally been skeptical of extensive gun rights, exhibiting 
a high degree of tolerance for firearm regulation.198  The incorporation of 
the Second Amendment against these states infringes considerably upon 
their ability to effectuate their state’s traditional policy on the right to bear 
arms, especially due to federal preemption of state right to bear arms claims. 
Property law and state constitutional law, however, provide a venue for 
both individual citizens and states to manifest their opposition to federal 
Second Amendment policy.  State courts have the power to interpret their 
constitutions without regard to any consideration of federal constitutional 
law.  State courts therefore are free to interpret their own right to bear arms 
policies in a manner inconsistent with, or even contrary to, federal Second 
Amendment policy, and thereby validate HOA servitudes that ban handgun 
 
196 See Jamal Greene, Guns, Originalism, and Cultural Cognition, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 511, 518 
(2010) (suggesting that “our cultural orientations will cause us to resist historical or social 
facts that point towards a competing risk assessment”). 
197 See generally Anthony Champagne, Political Parties and Judicial Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1411 (2001) (discussing positive aspects of political party involvement in judicial 
elections).  Cf. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html (reporting on 
Iowa voters’ ouster of three Iowa Supreme Court justices who ruled in the unanimous 
decision recognizing same-sex marriage in Iowa). 
198 For a comparison of the states’ tolerances of gun control, see Brady 2011 State Scorecards, 
BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/
stategunlaws/scorecard (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
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possession in the home.  The tables thus can be turned against conservative 
voices that advocate both states’ rights and gun rights. 
It is therefore likely that a patchwork approach will emerge amongst the 
states.  While some states may invalidate an HOA handgun ban, other states 
may not.199  Perhaps this distinction will fall along regional lines.200  More 
likely, however, given the flexibility of the public policy test, even a complex 
analysis based on the variable arguments identified in Part III of this 
Comment could fail to predict how state courts will rule on the issue.  The 
normative value of such a patchwork approach is a question for another day.  
It is enough at this juncture to recognize that HOA bans on handgun 
possession—or invalidation of such bans by courts or by legislatures—will 
allow states and citizens to order their constitutional values and build 
communities in accordance with their own ideas of safety and defense.  
Time will tell how far the looming penumbra of Heller will reach, but for now 
the narrow slice of our legal system occupied by HOAs remains fertile soil 
on which to experiment with limits on our right to keep and bear arms. 
 
 
199 A patchwork might also emerge within a state if the issue never reaches the state court of 
last resort. 
200 Gun ownership traces geographic patterns, so perhaps the validity of HOA handgun bans 
will follow suit.  See Deborah Azrael, Philip J. Cook & Matthew Miller, State and Local 
Prevalence of Firearms Ownership:  Measurement, Structure, and Trends, 20 J. QUANTITATIVE 
CRIMINOLOGY 43, 58–60, Table AIV (2004) (finding that 60% of Mississippi households 
keep a gun whereas 13% of Massachusetts households keep a gun); COOK & LUDWIG, 
supra note 180, at 31–32, 50 (finding that residents of rural areas and small towns are 
substantially more likely to be gun owners than residents of large cities). 
